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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-A CITIZEN SUIT UNDER EPCRA is No
LONGER A THREAT -- Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment,' the United States
Supreme Court considered whether the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act 2 (EPCRA) authorized citizens to sue for wholly past
violations.3 The Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal were in
disagreement on the question of whether EPCRA's language authorized such
citizen suits.4 The United States Supreme Court resolved this split by holding
that Citizens for a Better Environment lacked standing to maintain a suit for
Chicago Steel & Pickling Co.'s past violations.'
Part II of this note explores the facts of the Steel Company decision. Part
III briefly discusses the background of environmental citizen suits, and explains
the history and framework of EPCRA. Following an analysis of the Court's
reasoning in Part IV, this note considers the significance and future implica-
tions of the Steel Company ruling in Part V.
UI. FACTS
Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), a non-profit environmental
group, brought a private enforcement action against Chicago Steel & Pickling
Co. (Steel Co.).6 In March 1995, CBE discovered that Steel Co. had failed to
comply with the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act's
(EPCRA) reporting requirements since 1988. 7 Specifically, Steel Co. failed to
file inventory forms and toxic chemical release forms.8 CBE uses the reports
I. 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
2. EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11022, 11023 (1995).
3. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1006.
4. See id. at 1009.
5. See id. at 1020.
6. See Petitioner's Brief at 3, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003
(1997) (No. 221790). Steel Co. has been in business since 1971. See id. It is a small minority-
owned facility with 55 employees, located on the southeast side of Chicago. See id. Steel Co.
utilizes "steel pickling," a finishing process that removes scale and rust from steel coils. See
id. Scale is a "black or gray coating of oxide which forms on steel as it cools[;] [r]ust is a
reddish brittle coating formed on steel as it is attacked by moist air." Id.
7. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009. EPCRA is an informational statute which provides
citizens with information on the presence of extremely hazardous and toxic chemicals in their
community. See Petitioner's Brief at 5, Steel Co. (No. 221790). The information allows
community groups to form emergency response plans in the event of a toxic accident. See
EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11022, 11023 (1995).
8. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009. EPCRA mandates that Emergency and Hazardous
Chemical Inventory Forms and Toxic Chemical Release Forms be filed annually. See EPCRA,
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to educate themselves on the hazardous chemicals in the community and to
prepare emergency plans in the case of a chemical accident. 9
Pursuant to EPCRA requirements, CBE gave notice to the steel company
sixty days prior to filing their complaint.'" Steel Co. responded by promptly
filing all delinquent inventory and release forms." Once Steel Co. satisfied the
EPCRA filing requirements, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
chose not to pursue an administrative order or civil action against the steel
company. 12
On August 7, 1995, CBE brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. 3 Subsequently, Steel Co. filed motions to
dismiss according to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),
14
alleging that the district court did not have jurisdiction because all overdue
reports were filed at the time CBE's complaint was entered.' 5 Steel Co.'s
motion also alleged that EPCRA did not authorize suits for past violations.
16
The district court held for Steel Co., finding the court was without jurisdiction
and that EPCRA could not remedy past violations. 7 The Seventh Circuit
42 U.S.C. § 11022(a)(2). The forms contain information as to the names, properties, and
location of chemicals found at a facility, as well as the quantity of the chemical released into
the environment. See EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11022, 11023 (1995).
9. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1017.
10. See id. at 1009.
11. See id. Steel Co. alleged that they were unaware of EPCRA's reporting requirements.
See Petitioner's Brief at 3, Steel Co. (No. 221790). In addition, Steel Co. stated that the
information mandated by EPCRA was already reported in other forms to agencies. See id. "For
example, in 1991,... Steel [Co.] submitted a Chemical Safety Contingency Plan to the Chicago
Fire Department, ... Police Department and two hospitals detailing the chemicals present at the
facility and their chemical properties and locations." Id. During the sixty-day notice period,
Steel Co. submitted all delinquent forms to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Illinois EPA (IEPA), the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, and the Chicago Fire
Department. See id. at 8-9.
12. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009. If EPA had elected to pursue an action against Steel
Co., CBE would have been barred from filing suit. See EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(e) (1995).
13. See Petitioner's Brief at 9, Steel Co. (No. 221790). CBE calculated Steel Co.'s past
reporting violations to be 21,500. See id. Each violation is $25,000 per day, and CBE
"requested penalties of over $537 million." See id. It is interesting to note that the EPA treats
violations by a "first-time violator," such as Steel Co., as "one day" violations rather than "per
day" violations. See id. EPA reserves "per day" penalties for egregious violations. See id.
14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(l) is invoked for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction; Rule 12(b)(6) is invoked for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. See id.
15. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009. Steel Co. based their allegation on the Sixth
Circuit's holding in Atlantic States Legal Found, Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, Inc., 61
F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995). See Petitioner's Brief at 9, Steel Co. (No. 221790). Atlantic held that
EPCRA precluded citizen suits for purely past violations. See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc.
v. United Musical Instruments, Inc., 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995).
16. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009.
17. See id. See Part III.C. infra, for reasoning of the district and appellate courts.
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Court of Appeals, however, reversed.' 8 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari 9 to cure the split among the circuits as to whether EPCRA
allowed citizen suits for past violations.2"
III. BACKGROUND
A. History of Environmental Citizen Suits
The 1960's marked the beginning of environmental law as we know it.
21
During that time, the environment began showing severe signs of pollution,
something government regulation and voluntary industry compliance were no
longer able to prevent.22 Throughout the next two decades, environmental
awareness grew, calling attention to the lack of governmental enforcement of
environmental laws.23 Congress was forced to face the issue of ineffective
enforcement, and the first "citizen suit" provision resulted.2
Citizen suits are a critical supplement to governmental enforcement of
environmental regulations. 25 The first citizen suit provision was incorporated
into the 1970 Clean Air Act.26 Through the Clean Air Act, for the first time in
environmental law, citizens were given a cause of action to protect public
resources. 27 Citizen suits enforce environmental regulations when government
cannot because of limited resources.28 Congress has included citizen suit
18. See id.
19. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1998).
20. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009.
21. See Jeffrey A. Keithline, Note, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Citizen Suits: Should the Supreme Court Extend Gwaltney?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227,
1233 (1997).
22. See Robert W. Shavelson, EPCRA, Citizen Suits and the Sixth Circuit's Assault of the
Public's Right-to-Know, 2-Fall ALT. L. ENvTL. OUTLOOK 29 (1995). Due to the use of a
pesticide called DDT and other chemical releases, the bald eagle approached extinction, "rivers
caught fire.... [and] air reeked of industrial stench .... " Id.
23. See Keithline, supra note 21, at 1234.
24. See Keithline, supra note 21, at 1234.
25. See Michael J. Vahey, Comment, Hazardous Chemical Reporting Under EPCRA: The
Seventh Circuit Eliminates the "Better Late Than Never" Excuse From Citizen Suits, 29 LOY.
U. CH1. L.J. 225, 241-42 (1997).
26. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1995); see Shavelson, supra note 22, at 29. The
term "citizen suit" was originally coined in a Michigan law drafted by Professor Joseph Sax.
See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 29. Sax developed citizen suits to alleviate the "threat to
environmental laws posed by budgetary and political limitations on government enforcement."
See Vahey, supra note 25, at 241.
27. See Keithline, supra note 21, at 1233. The citizen suit provision was included in the
Clean Air Act despite industry's and courts' concerns regarding frivolous suits "overloading
the dockets." See Keithline, supra note 21, at 1235.
28. See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 29. See also Vahey, supra note 25, at 241-42.
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provisions in nearly every environmental regulation since 1970; each has been
modeled after the original Clean Air Act provision. 9
B. EPCRA
1. Enactment of EPCRA
Congress enacted EPCRA in response to two major chemical accidents.30
The first accident occurred in 1984 in Bhopal, India, at a Union Carbide
pesticide plant.31 The Bhopal chemical accident killed over 2,000 people,
injured over 200,000, and became known as one of the worst tragedies in
modem industrial times.32 In 1985, less than a year later, another Union
Carbide plant experienced a toxic leak, this time closer to home in Institute,
West Virginia. 3 The West Virginia chemical accident took the form of a toxic
gas cloud that hovered over the city, causing 200 people to seek medical aid.34
At the time the two Union Carbide accidents occurred, a national program
providing citizens with information regarding hazardous chemicals in their
communities did not exist, and this left public officials guessing at how to
respond to the disasters.35
Congress also reacted to recent studies that showed the Union Carbide
accidents were not the first chemical accidents to occur and certainly would not
29. See Keithline, supra note 21, at 1238. It is interesting to note the original language
used in the Clean Air Act has been modified to fit each environmental regulation. See
Keithline, supra note 21, at 1238. "Congress has... possibly unintentionally [ ] drafted citizen
suit provisions such that" citizens have greater enforcement authority than the EPA. See
Keithline, supra note 21, at 1238.
30. See Marie Lohmann, Note and Comment, The Uncertain Future of Citizen Suits under
EPCRA: Can Citizens Sue for Past Violations of the Statute's Reporting Requirements?, 30
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1709, 1713-14 (1997).
31. Seeid. at 1713.
32. See id. at 1713-14. Forty-five tons of methyl isocyanate, a toxic chemical, leaked from
a faulty storage tank, causing the accident. See id. at 1713. See also Jayne S.A. Pritchard,
Comment, A Closer Look at Title III of SARA: Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act of 1986, 6 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 203, 203-04 (1988).
33. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1714.
34. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1714. The accident occurred when a failed valve on
a storage tank leaked while under extreme pressure. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1714. The
tank contained 500 pounds of aldicarb oxime, a derivative of the chemical that leaked at the
Bhopal plant. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1714.
35. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1715. See also Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing
About the Public Right to Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 218 (1996). "[L]ocal
authorities were confused about what was happening, what substance was involved, and how
to protect citizens." Id.
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be the last. 6 In response to the Bhopal and Institute chemical accidents and
information revealed through recent chemical accident studies, Congress
enacted the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of
1986."7 Congress introduced EPCRA as Title III of the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA); 38 however, EPCRA is a free-
standing law.3
2. Purpose and Function of EPCRA
EPCRA is unique because it is the first environmental regulation that is
purely informational in contrast to the typical "command and control"
regulations enacted by Congress.40 As its name indicates, EPCRA serves two
primary functions: emergency planning and the public's right to know about
the chemicals used and stored in their community.4' Furnishing citizens with
information regarding toxics in their communities allows local community
groups to form emergency response plans in the case of a chemical accident.42
The first function, emergency planning and notification, requires local
communities to formulate advanced emergency response plans.43 EPCRA does
not spell out the specific emergency plan that state or local government should
follow; it merely provides a framework for community groups to use in
producing a response plan." The "notification" portion requires that an
industrial facility immediately notify the local community group if a hazardous
chemical release has occurred.45
36. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1715. "[O]ne 1985 publication claimed that 'in
America... 60,000 chemicals are produced in over 6,000 communities and last year alone we
had 5,700 toxic chemical accidents."' Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1715.
37. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 218-19.
38. See SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1995).
39. See Eric M. Falkenberry, The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act: A Tool for Toxic Release Reduction in the 90's, 3 BuFF. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 4 (1995). SARA
amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), which is also known as "Superfund." See Wolf, supra note 35, at 219.
40. See Keithline, supra note 21, at 1257. "[U]nlike most environmental statutes[,]
[EPCRA] does not specify discharge standards, nor does it impose liability for harming the
environment." Keithline, supra note 21, at 1257.
41. See Barbara Ann Clay, Note and Comment, The EPA's Proposed Phase-ll Expansion
of the Toxic Release (TRI) Reporting Requirements: Everything and the Kitchen Sink, 15 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 299 (1997). "Right-to-know" is a term of art used to describe policies
"addressing the disclosure of chemical hazard information to populations at risk." See id. at
298-99.
42. See id. at 299.
43. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 220.
44. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 220.
45. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 220.
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The second function, community right-to-know, allows citizens to request
and receive information about hazardous and toxic chemicals used at a facility
without first going through government channels.' EPCRA's community
right-to-know requirement was a matter of great debate due to its expansive
industrial disclosure requirements. 7
EPCRA has been regarded as a potent environmental weapon due to its
visible impact on industrial actions. 4' The first EPCRA reports were released
in 1988, noting individual companies and their yearly amounts of chemical
releases.4 9 As a result of the EPCRA reports, industries began rethinking their
production processes and utilized less hazardous chemicals and methods."
Overall, industries have attempted to reduce toxic chemical releases to sustain
a positive community-industry relationship.5 1 Although EPCRA has become
one of the most significant pieces of environmental legislation, partly due to its
right-to-know provision, it remains little-known. 2
3. EPCRA Provisions
EPCRA contains three subtitles: Subtitle A, "Emergency Planning and
Notification;" Subtitle B, "Reporting Requirements;" and Subtitle C, "General
Provisions.""
a. Emergency planning and notification
The emergency planning and notification provisions require each state to
establish a state emergency response commission (SERC) and a local
emergency planning committee (LEPC).54 The SERCs, appointed by each
state's governor, coordinate emergency response plans and supervise the
46. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 220.
47. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 220. Congress included the right-to-know portion in
EPCRA despite opposition from the industrial sector. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 220.
48. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 221. The Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) requirement
under EPCRA is "among our most potent environmental weapons." See Wolf, supra note 35,
at 220-21.
49. See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 30. Corporate officials, consumers, and stockholders
were all surprised when they noted the amounts and types of yearly chemical releases. See
Shavelson, supra note 22, at 30. Perhaps the greatest influence was that of the consumers and
stockholders, who began holding industries responsible "through consumer purchasing
decisions and at corporate shareholder meetings." See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 30.
50. See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 30.
51. See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 30.
52. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 220. EPCRA is less known than the Clean Air Act and
the Clean Water Act. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 220.
53. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 221-22.
54. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 222. See also Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1716.
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LEPCs' activities.5  Each state is divided into local emergency planning
districts. 56 The SERCs appoint an LEPC for each local emergency planning
district. 7
LEPCs are selected from fourteen different groups and organizations in
the community; these commissions thus represent a large portion of the
population.58 SERCs and LEPCs formulate and implement procedures for
receiving information from facilities regarding on-site toxic chemicals in order
to form the emergency response plans.5 9 In addition, SERCs and LEPCs
process public requests for information. 60 LEPCs design and implement local
response plans that include evacuation routes, warning signals, and medical
information regarding the specific chemicals used at a facility; the plans also
involve coordination of police and fire departments, the media, medical staff,
and the public.61 An elected chairperson heads each LEPC, which submits the
response plan to the SERC for approval.6 2
All facilities subject to EPCRA requirements must contact the pertinent
SERC, LEPC, and fire department if the facility possesses any chemical listed
as an "Extremely Hazardous Substance" (EHS) and the amount of substance
on-site exceeds a "Threshold Planning Quantity" (TPQ).63 An owner or
operator of a facility must have a designated representative to work with SERC
and LEPC; however, no exemption exists for liability due to a toxic accident
even though the facility willingly cooperates with the LEPC.64
55. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 222.
56. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 222.
57. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 222.
58. See Falkenberry, supra note 39, at 5.
59. See Falkenberry, supra note 39, at 5.
60. See Falkenberry, supra note 39, at 5.
61. See Falkenberry, supra note 39, at 5.
62. See Falkenberry, supra note 39, at 5.
63. See Falkenberry, supra note 39, at 6. EPCRA defines facility as "buildings,
equipment, structures, and other stationary items which are located on a single site or on
contiguous or adjacent sites and which are owned and operated by the same person." 42 U.S.C.
§ 11049(4) (1995). An "Extremely Hazardous Substance" is defined under EPCRA §
302(a)(2). If the EPA does not set a TPQ for a particular substance, the TPQ is set at two
pounds per facility until a TPQ is established. See Falkenberry, supra note 39, at 6.
64. See Falkenberry, supra note 39, at 6. Information to be reported by facilities includes:
(1) Chemical name of the substance released; (2) whether the substance is listed as an EHS; (3)
estimate of quantity released; (4) time and duration of release; (5) known or anticipated acute
or chronic health risks; (6) precautions to be taken due to the release; and (7) name and phone




Pursuant to EPCRA's reporting requirements, facility owners must submit
three documents: Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), Emergency and
Hazardous Chemical Inventory Forms, and Toxic Chemical Release Forms.
65
The documents provide information to citizens regarding chemical use, storage,
and releases.
66
Emergency and Hazardous Chemical Inventory Forms exist as Tier I or
Tier II; however, only Tier I is mandatory. A Tier I form requires a facility
to summarize the amounts of chemicals and their location at the facility. 6 Tier
II is required only upon request from a SERC, LEPC, or the fire department.69
Tier II forms contain Tier I information as well as storage mechanisms of each
chemical and whether the owner claims trade secret privileges as to any
chemicals.70
The third and most controversial type of required reporting is the Toxic
Chemical Release Reporting.71 Each facility must file annual reports
documenting releases and transfers of toxic chemicals. 72 The states collect the
reports, and the EPA formulates the information in a computerized database
known as the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Database.73 The TRI database
65. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1717. MSDSs are reporting requirements found under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA). See OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1998).
These data sheets provide employees with information as to chemicals used at a facility. See
Wolf, supra note 35, at 225.
66. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 224-25. Information regarding use and storage of
chemicals includes the "types, amounts, location and potential effects" of chemicals used at a
facility. See Wolf supra note 35, at 224-25. Information regarding chemical releases includes
"releases into the air, water[,] or soil." See Wolf, supra note 35, at 225.
67. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 227.
68. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 227. Tier I information allows communities to know "how
and where large amounts of potentially dangerous chemicals reside." See Wolf, supra note 35,
at 227.
69. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 227.
70. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 227. Trade secret information does not have to be
reported; however, a facility may still be required to report the privileged information if it is
requested by a health professional in response to emergency planning. See Wolf, supra note
35, at 235. In order for a facility to claim trade secret privileges, the following conditions must
be met: (1) "the withheld information must not have been disclosed to anybody other than the
government or a person bound by a confidentiality agreement;" (2) disclosure is not made under
other laws; (3) forcing the facility to disclose the information will affect the facility's
competitive position; and (4) the chemical will probably not be discovered through reverse
engineering. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 235.
71. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 229. Toxic Chemical Release Reporting is governed by
EPCRA § 313 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1995)).
72. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 229.
73. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 229-30. "The TRI database is the first chemical-specific,
multi-media accounting of toxic releases to the environment ever mandated by federal law."
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serves many purposes.7 4 First, the information alerts citizens to the chemical
releases and transfers throughout their communities.75 In addition, the TRI data
supplements research used to develop future environmental regulations and
standards.76
Information pertaining to Toxic Chemical Release Reports is issued on
what is called a Form R; the forms must be submitted by July of each year to
cover the preceding year's releases." Form Rs require large facilities to report
annual releases of toxic chemicals into the environment.78
c. General provisions
The third subtitle contains general provisions regarding trade secret
information and enforcement provisions.79 The enforcement provisions give
the government and citizens the right to force a facility to abide by EPCRA
requirements.8" Penalties for failure to comply with EPCRA provisions consist
of a $25,000 fine for each day a violation occurs as well as civil, administra-
tive, and criminal penalties for failure to comply with emergency notification
81provisions.
Due to the expansive number of facilities subject to EPCRA in the United
States, EPA does not have the resources to enforce compliance.82 The citizen
suit provisions in EPCRA were drafted to alleviate this shortcoming.83 Under
EPCRA, any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against
an owner or operator of a facility for failure to submit and complete EPCRA
required forms.8
Wolf, supra note 35, at 230.
74. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 230.
75. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 230.
76. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 230.
77. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 230-31. A Form R is a standardized form created by the
EPA. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 230.
78. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 230. It is interesting to note that the information reported
must be "estimates of releases," not actual measurements. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 231. TRI
reporting pertains to large facilities. See Wolf, supra note 35, at 231. A facility must report if
the following conditions are met: (1) the facility "manufactures in Standard Industrial
Classifications (SIC Codes) 20-39;" (2) facility consists of ten or more full-time employees;
and (3) the facility "manufacture[s], process[es], . . . or use[s] toxic chemicals above yearly
threshold amounts." See Wolf, supra note 35, at 231.
79. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1722.
80. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1722.
81. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1722.
82. See Jim Scott, Note, Permissibility of Citizen Suits Under EPCRA for Wholly Past
Violations in the Seventh Circuit: Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co., 4 Wis. ENVTL.
L.J. 215, 219 (1997).
83. See id.
84. See EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1). Any person may commence a civil action on
1999]
UALR LAW REVIEW
Citizens must give notice to the facility and EPA sixty days prior to filing
suit. The notice provisions, along with the phrase "failure to submit and
complete," account for the ambiguity that is found to exist in EPCRA.85 Two
meanings to the ambiguous provisions have surfaced. 86 First, facilities are
liable for past violations; second, facilities may submit delinquent forms,
thereby escaping liability.
87
C. Split Among the Circuits
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have disagreed upon whether EPCRA
authorizes citizen suits for wholly past violations. 88 The Sixth Circuit, in
Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. United Musical Instruments,8 9 held that
citizens could not sue for past violations. The Seventh Circuit, in Citizens for
a Better Environment v. Steel Co.,90 rejected the Sixth Circuit's holding and
his own behalf against "(A) an owner or operator ... for failure to . . ." submit follow-up
emergency notification; MSDSs; inventory forms; or toxic chemical release forms. See id. A
follow-up notification report provides information regarding actions taken to respond to a
chemical release, including additional health and medical risks and advice. See Steven J.
Christiansen & Stephen H. Urquhart, The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know
Act of 1986: Analysis and Update, 6 BYU J. PuB. L. 235, 241 (1992).
85. See EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (a)(1)(A)(iii). See also Lohmann, supra note 30, at
1722; Scott, supra note 82, at 220.
86. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1722.
87. See Lohmann, supra note 30, at 1722.
88. See Scott, supra note 82, at 217-18.
89. 61 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 1995).
90. 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998). Three district courts,
prior to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Atlantic allowed recovery for past violations: Atlantic
States Legal Foundation v. hiting, Williams v. Leybold Technologies, and Delaware Valley
Toxics Coalition v. Kurt-Hastings, Inc. See Scott, supra note 82, at 220-21. See also Atlantic
States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.Y.
1991); Williams v. Leybold Techs., 784 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1992); and Delaware Valley
Toxics Coalition v. Kurtz-Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1993). In Whiting, the
Atlantic States Legal Foundation alleged that Whiting failed to submit MSDSs, inventory
forms, and release forms; however, by the time suit was filed, Whiting had submitted two of
the three delinquent forms. See Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 746. Whiting claimed its compliance
barred Atlantic States Legal Foundation's suit. See id. The court held that "this Court's
acceptance of the defendant's interpretation would render gratuitous the compliance dates for
initial submissions which Congress placed in EPCRA's reporting provisions." Id. at 750. See
also Scott, supra note 82, at 221 (quoting Whiting, 772 F. Supp. at 750). In Williams, Leybold
failed to file an MSDS for nickel. See Williams, 784 F. Supp. at 766. At the time, threshold
requirements for nickel had not been set. See id. at 767-68. EPA later established the threshold
requirements; the amount of nickel at Leybold was well below reporting requirements. See id.
at 768. The plaintiff filed suit after EPA established the threshold requirements. See id. The
court held Leybold was in compliance at the time suit was filed; however, the court also found
that EPCRA permitted suits for past violations. See id. at 770. In Kurtz-Hastings, the coalition
alleged that Kurtz-Hastings failed to file release forms; after notice of intent to sue, Kurtz-
Hastings filed the delinquent forms. See Kurtz-Hastings, 813 F. Supp. at 1136. The court
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chose to follow all other courts prior to Atlantic in holding citizens could sue
for past violations. Both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits claimed to base their
decision on the Supreme Court's holding in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.91
1. The Gwaltney Decision
In Gwaltney, the issue was whether §505(a) of the Clean Water Act
(CWA) authorized citizen suits for past violations.92 The CWA makes it
unlawful for a facility to discharge any pollutant into navigable waters except
as authorized by the CWA.93 The Clean Water Act also provides citizens with
the right to sue any person alleged to be in violation of the Act.94
Gwaltney, a meat-packing plant, obtained a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit which authorized Gwaltney to release
seven pollutants into the Pagan River in Smithfield, Virginia.95 Gwaltney
failed to comply with the NPDES permit and exceeded effluent limitations on
five of the seven pollutants.'
Two environmental groups, Chesapeake Bay Foundation and National
Resource Defense Council, sent Gwaltney a notice of intent to sue in 1984,
alleging that Gwaltney had violated and would continue to violate its NPDES
permit.97 Gwaltney brought a motion to dismiss, claiming that the CWA only
authorized citizen suits where a defendant was violating the Act at the time suit
was filed; Gwaltney was in compliance when the environmental groups filed
suit.98
The district court ruled for the environmental groups, holding that the
CWA allowed citizens to sue for past violations." The Fourth Circuit Court
found for the coalition, holding that allowing Kurtz-Hastings to cure the violation by filing late
would make citizen suit provisions ineffective. See id. at 1141-42.
91. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). See Keithline, supra note 21, at 1231.
92. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52
(1987).
93. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a); see also Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 52.
94. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 53.
95. See id.
96. See id. "Between... 1981 ... and... 1984, [Gwaltney] violated its [total Kjeldahl
nitrogen] limitation 87 times, its chlorine limitations 34 times, and its fecal coliform limitations
31 times." Id.
97. See id. at 54.




of Appeals affirmed.'00 Both courts based their decisions on the Clean Water
Act's legislative history and purpose.' '
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court first looked to the statute's
language.0 2 Although the Court found the language to be ambiguous, it
concluded that its most natural reading required citizens to allege a continuous
or intermittent violation. 0 3 Next, the Court made note of the present tense
utilized in the CWA.' 4 Finally, the Court looked to the purpose of the notice
of intent to sue requirement.'05 The Court found the purpose of the notice
requirement was to give facilities an opportunity to be in compliance,
dispelling the need for a citizen suit.36 In addition, the Court stated that
allowing suits for past violations would make the notice requirement to alleged
violators merely gratuitous. 1
07
2. The Sixth Circuit Decision
In Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments,' Atlantic
States Legal Foundation (ASLF), an environmental organization, alleged that
United Musical Instruments (UMI) violated EPCRA reporting requirements.
UMI, a manufacturer of musical instruments in Eastlake, Ohio, failed to file
form Rs regarding the storage and usage of toxic chemicals at its facility."' 9
ASLF notified UMI of its intent to sue and, UMI then submitted the required
form Rs." ° UMI filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that EPCRA did not allow
citizen suits for past violations."'
The Sixth Circuit agreed with UMI and affirmed the district court's
dismissal." 2 As in Gwaltney, the court first looked to the plain language of
EPCRA." 3 The court explained that although form Rs are required to be
submitted by a certain date, the basis of a citizen suit is the failure to complete
100. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 57. The Court pointed out that Congress could have phrased the language
as "to have violated" rather than "to be in violation" if they intended to include past violations.
See id.
104. See id. at 59. The act uses the present tense in the phrase "to be in violation." See
Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (a)(1)(ii) (1995).
105. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59.
106. See id. at 60.
107. See id.
108. 61 F.3d 473,474 (6th Cir. 1995).
109. See id.
110. See id. See supra note 77 for the definition of a Form R.
111. See Atlantic, 61 F.3d at 474.
112. See id. at 475.
113. See id.
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and submit a required form."4 The court further stated that a form is completed
and filed even though it may be untimely." '5
Next, comparing EPCRA to the Clean Water Act, the court followed
Gwaltney's reasoning regarding the notice requirement.116 The court pointed
to likenesses between EPCRA and the Clean Water Act such as the sixty-day
notice requirement and the prohibition of a citizen suit once EPA enforcement
actions have begun. "7 Following Gwaltney, the court recognized that the sixty-
day notice period allows a facility to cure a violation and government agencies
to take appropriate action, both of which dispel the need for a citizen suit." 8
The most natural reading of EPCRA, the court concluded, did not authorize
citizen suits for past violations." 9
ASLF argued that, after Gwaltney, Congress amended the Clean Air Act
to allow citizen suits for past violations; however, the sixty-day notice
requirement was unchanged. 20 ASLF claimed that Congress's position on the
sixty-day notice period was not in agreement with Gwaltney's reasoning.
121
The court rejected this argument, holding that Congress would have amended
EPCRA as well as the Clean Water Act had Congress intended to allow
EPCRA citizen suit provisions to maintain suits for past violations.
22
3. The Seventh Circuit Decision
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced the issue of whether EPCRA
authorized citizen suits for past violations."'2 CBE brought suit against Steel
Co. for failing to file a single inventory or toxic release form. 24 Upon
receiving CBE's notice of intent to sue, Steel Co. filed all overdue forms,
bringing themselves into compliance.'2 5
The district court followed the Sixth Circuit's lead in Gwaltney and
dismissed CBE's suit.126 The district court explained that the forms were no
longer overdue and that this caused the violation to be in the past. The court
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 476.
117. See Atlantic, 61 F.3d at 476.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 477. "Congress could have phrased its requirements in language that looked




123. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1242 (7th Cir. 1996).
124. See id. at 1241.
125. See id. See Part II. supra, for a detailed summary of the facts.
126. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1242.
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then stated that past violations were not a cause of action that EPCRA
authorized under the citizen suit provisions.127
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit criticized the Sixth Circuit for applying a
literal interpretation of the Gwaltney holding to EPCRA1 28 The Seventh
Circuit did not apply the Gwaltney holding; however, the court did choose to
use Gwaltney's interpretive methodology.1
29
As did the Gwaltney court, the Seventh Circuit first turned to EPCRA's
plain meaning.130 The court distinguished EPCRA's language from the Clean
Water Act's language by noting the verb-tense of each act.13' The court
explained that the Clean Water Act is worded in the present tense, whereas
EPCRA is worded in a more neutral language. 32 The court concluded that
Congress could have included language limiting citizen suits to only present
violations. 1
33
The Seventh Circuit next addressed the sixty-day notice requirement. 1
34
The court held that permitting a cause of action for past violations did not
render the notice requirement merely gratuitous. 135 The court reasoned that the
purpose of the notice provision is to mitigate damages because each day a
violation occurs there is an additional fine. 136 In addition, the notice allows
EPA the option of addressing a facility's violations before any other group or
organization. 1
37
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split
between the Sixth and Seventh Circuits as to whether EPCRA authorizes
citizens to sue for past violations. 138 The United States Supreme Court faced
two possible jurisdictional issues and the dilemma as to which should be




130. See id. at 1242-44.
131. See id.
132. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244. According to the court, EPCRA's language could





137. See Citizens, 90 F.3d at 1244.
138. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009.
139. See id.
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without constitutional standing, the Court would not have proper jurisdiction. 40
The second issue was whether CBE had statutory standing; in other words, the
Court needed to determine whether § 11046(a) of EPCRA permitted CBE's
cause of action. 141
The Court stated that it is well settled that the absence of a cause of action
does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction.1 42 The Court has jurisdiction if
a petitioner will have the right to recover under one construction of the
Constitution and laws of the United States but will be defeated under another
construction. 143 The Court further noted that a court may properly dismiss a
suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the claim is insubstantial and
devoid of merit.'" In the present case, CBE would win under one construction
of EPCRA but would lose under another construction.m
45
Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence that the Court had previously
decided statutory standing questions before constitutional standing questions."
The majority opinion, however, stated that Stevens's concurrence was not
presenting a statutory question of standing; the Court explained that Stevens's
approach would amount to a premature determination of the merits. 47 Scalia
further stated that Stevens was unable to point to a case in which the Court
labeled a cause of action as jurisdictional and decided that question before the




141. See id. The Court stated that the standing issue is normally considered a threshold
question and would be decided first; however, due to Justice Stevens's claim that the second
issue (whether EPCRA authorizes suits for past violations) was also a jurisdictional issue, the
Court saw a need for a discussion of jurisdictional issues. See id.
142. See id. at 1010.
143. See id. "[T]he District Court has jurisdiction if 'the right of petitioners to recover
under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are
given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another[.]' Id. (quoting Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946)).
144. SeeSteel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1010. Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
proper when the claim is "insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of the Court,
or otherwise completely devoid of merit ..... 1d. (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of New York
v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974)).
145. See id. Scalia noted that Stevens did not argue that CBE's claim was immaterial. See
id. Instead, Stevens relied on another Supreme Court case, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., which treated a "similar issue as jurisdictional." See id. See
also Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 49. In reference to Gwaltney, however, Scalia noted that the
"jurisdictional character of the elements of the cause of action in Gwaltney made no substantive
difference... , had been assumed by the parties, and was assumed without discussion by the
Court." Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1011. The Court stated that Gwaltney is considered a "drive-
by" jurisdictional ruling and has no precedential effect. See id.
146. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1011 (Stevens, J., concurring).
147. See id. Stevens asked the Court to first answer the question whether the scope of
EPCRA included a right of action for past violations. See id.
148. See id. Scalia noted that the consequences of deciding a merit question before a
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The Court declared that it would refuse to decide any cause of action, even
though labeled jurisdictional, before deciding whether the case meets Article
III jurisdictional requirements. 49 The Court stated that the jurisdiction of the
present court-as well as the jurisdiction of the court from which the case
comes-should always be decided first. 150 The Court explained that a court
cannot decide questions of law when there is doubt as to that court's jurisdic-
tion.15' To do so is called "hypothetical jurisdiction," which is much like
issuing an advisory opinion.152 The Court held that the issue of whether CBE
had standing should be decided first.'53
The Court reiterated that Article III standing consists of three require-
ments: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.' 54 CBE alleged that Steel
Co.'s failure to file toxic chemical inventory and release forms was an injury
in fact to them. 55 The Court did not decide the merits of that allegation; it
instead held that CBE's claim was not redressable.1
5 6
In considering the redressability question, the Court looked to CBE's
Complaint. 157 The complaint asked for: (1) a declaratory judgment that Steel
Company violated EPCRA; (2) authorization for CBE to inspect the steel
company; (3) an order requiring the Steel Company to provide copies of all
compliance reports; (4) payment of a civil penalty; (5) costs and attorneys fees;
and (6) any other appropriate relief.'58
The Court easily disposed of the first item. 159 The Court stated that a
declaratory judgment would be worthless because there was no controversy as
standing question are great; "[i]t would turn every statutory question in an EPCRA citizen suit
into a question of jurisdiction." Id.
149. See id. at 1011.
150. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012.
151. See id. at 1016.
152. See id. An advisory opinion has been "disapproved by this Court from the beginning."
Id. (quoting Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911)). Stevens, in his concurrence,
endorsed the use of "hypothetical jurisdiction," which is an approach used by courts of appeal.
See id. at 1012. Several Courts of Appeal "find it proper to proceed immediately to the merits
question, despite jurisdictional objections ... where the merits question is more readily resolved
... and the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party were
jurisdiction denied." Id. The majority declined to endorse this approach. See id.
153. See id. at 1016.
154. See id. at 1016-17. An injury in fact is a concrete harm suffered by a plaintiff. See
id. at 1016. Causation is a traceable connection between the injury in fact and the defendant's
conduct. See id. at 1017. Redressability is whether the relief requested by the plaintiff will
address plaintiffs injury. See id.
155. See id. at 1018.
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to whether Steel Co. was in violation of EPCRA filing requirements.'6' The
fourth item, payment of a civil penalty, was not redressable because the penalty
was payable to the United States Treasury.' 6' The Court explained that
payment to the Treasury was not remedial but rather vindictive in that merely
satisfying CBE with a favorable judgment would not remedy an injury.162 As
to item five, costs of litigation, the Court found that CBE could not invent
standing by bringing suit.163 Litigation must redress CBE's injury in some way
other than for the cost of the litigation itself. '"
The Court noted that the remaining items in CBE's complaint, items two
and three, served to discourage future violations of EPCRA.' 65 Although the
Court acknowledged that deterring future violations can be remedial, it went
on to find that a threatened violation was not one of CBE's allegations.'
According to the Court, neither authorizing CBE to inspect Steel Co.'s facility
nor requiring Steel Co. to turn over compliance reports to CBE could redress
a past wrong. 167 Due to the fact that only past violations were alleged, the
complaint was not redressable.
16
The United States Supreme Court, finding the complaint lacked
redressability, held that CBE lacked standing to sue. 16 9 The Court held that it
did not have jurisdiction over this matter and neither do the lower courts. 170
V. SIGNIFICANCE
As a result of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Steel Co.,
EPCRA violators are now free to withhold compliance until they receive a
notice of intent to sue. 17 1 Once noticed, violators can choose to submit all
overdue forms, making each violation a past violation and thus rendering
citizen suits barred.
In effect, the Supreme Court's ruling undermines the purpose of a citizen
suit.172 In the past, citizen suits have made facilities think twice about violating
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018-19.
163. See id. at 1019. "[P]Ilaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by





168. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 37.
172. See Keithline, supra note 21, at 1261.
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environmental regulations because courts often assess steep penalties. 73
Allowing a facility to bring themselves into compliance after receiving notice
lessens a citizen suit's effectiveness and leaves little incentive for a facility to
comply. 1
74
In addition, citizens and environmental groups will no longer have an
incentive to spend time and money for research and discovery. 75 The only
time an EPCRA citizen suit can proceed to trial is when a facility fails to cure
all delinquent reporting requirements within the sixty-day notice period.176
Barring citizen suits for past violations prevents citizens from receiving
reimbursement for pre-trial expenses; this is a chance many private citizens and
non-profit organizations cannot afford to take.
The Supreme Court's ruling may also undermine EPCRA's goals. 177 For
the emergency response plans to work effectively, facilities must submit timely
reports.178 The release and inventory reports containing amounts, types, and
locations of chemicals, form the basis for the response plans. Furthermore,
allowing facilities to file untimely reports neutralizes EPCRA's community
right-to-know provisions. 179 Logic dictates that, without the user's submission
of informational reports, citizens cannot know of the chemicals in their locality.
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co. will stifle the vigor
in which citizen suits for EPCRA violations are pursued, it may not be a loop-
hole readily jumped through by industrial facilities. 180 Much of the information
industries are required to report pursuant to EPCRA is already available to the
public through other reporting requirements; therefore, industries do not
receive any benefit from not complying with EPCRA.' 8' Additionally, the fear
of critical public exposure is a force which continues to compel industries to
comply with environmental regulations.'82
173. See Keithline, supra note 21, at 1263. Court-assessed penalties are generally much
higher than a settlement between EPA and the facility. See Keithline, supra note 21, at 1263.
174. See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 37.
175. See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 39.
176. See Katarina K. Boer, Comment, United Musical Instruments v. The Steel Company:
The Conflict Over the Safety of Our Communities and the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1599, 1630-40 (1997).
177. See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 38-39.
178. See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 38-39.
179. See Shavelson, supra note 22, at 38-39.
180. Interview with Randy Thurman, Director of the Arkansas Envtl. Federation, in Little
Rock, Ark. (Aug. 5, 1998).
181. See id.; see also Letter from Randy Thurman, Director, Arkansas Envtl. Federation,
to OPPT Docket Clerk, EPA (Dec. 19, 1996) (on file with the Arkansas Envtl. Fed.). Facilities
must report much of the same information required under EPCRA in order to receive permits
pursuant to the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. See Interview with Randy Thurman,
supra note 180.
182. See Interview with Randy Thurman, supra note 180. Mr. Thurman explained that the
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The Supreme Court's holding does not encourage citizens to utilize their
rights promulgated under EPCRA; however, the holding also does not
influence industries to stop complying with EPCRA. Whether the Steel Co.
ruling frustrates Congress's goal in enacting EPCRA--to protect citizens
through making each community aware of the chemicals in their local-
ity-remains to be seen.
Julie Shambarger Mitchell
fear of bad public exposure is a force strong enough to make industries comply. Mr. Thurman
revealed that there are other means in which the public can discover who are the "bad"
companies; for example, the Environmental Defense Fund has a web site which lists the "worst
players [industrial facilities] in every community." See Interview with Randy Thurman, supra
note 180.
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